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Abstract 
This paper aims to study corruption as an epidemic phenomenon 
using the epidemic diffusion model of Kermack and Mc-Kendrick (1927). 
We seek to determine the dynamics of corruption and its impact on the 
composition of the population at a given time. We determine a threshold 
epidemiological corruption based on the approximation of the honest 
population. 
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Introduction  
Corruption is a complex social, political, and economic phenomenon 
that affects all countries at different degrees. Corruption is usually qualified 
as unethical because it may have unexpectedly harmful effects on economic 
development, breeding negative work ethics and leading to waste and 
misallocation of resources, as well as adverse distribution of income and 
wealth. It is often associated with violence, crime, and in extreme cases may 
result in popular revolts like the recent Tunisian revolution of freedom and 
dignity. In recent years a huge of research has been interested to the 
phenomenon. Researchers have studied many topics. On a macro level, some 
works have studied the economic, political, and cultural determinants of 
corruption using econometric approaches (Svensson 2005,  Iwasaki and 
Suzuki 2012). On a micro level some researchers have used the framework 
of utility maximization under uncertainty (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; 
Beenstock, 1979) and others have applied game theory models (Macrae 
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1982, Era Balba 2000)  in order to answer to the question: what is the basis 
for decisions of reasonable men to be corrupt? 
 In contrast to the large literature on political, social, and economical 
aspects of corruption there is only a small number of attempts to model the 
dynamics of corruption in a mathematically quantified way. One of the major 
problems of corruption is its diffusion what is usually called epidemic 
corruption.  
Becker, Egger and Seidel (2008) deliver an empirical model of 
perceived corruption which allows for epidemic effects or, in other words, 
the infection of other countries with (non-) corrupt behavior or the perception 
thereof. Using a cross-section of 123 economies for the year 2000, they 
illustrate that corruption in one country spills over to adjacent economies. 
This finding implies that institutional changes reducing corruption in one 
country lead to smaller but qualitatively similar effects in neighboring 
countries. Blanchard, Krueger and Martin (2005) present a model for the 
spread of corruption on complex networks in the spirit of epidemiology. 
Their model describes aspects of the evolution of corruption in a virtual 
population and incorporates some basic universal features of corruption. 
 Considering corruption as a nonstandard epidemic process relies on 
the plausible assumption that corruption rarely emerges out of nothing but is 
usually related to some already corrupt environment which may ‖infect‖ 
susceptibles. The aim of this paper is to study the dynamics of corruption in 
a closed population using the epidemiological SIR (Susceptibles, Infected, 
Removed) model of Kendrick and MacKermack (1927) and its extensions. In 
the first section we state the hypothesis and we formulate the dynamics of 
corrupt population. In the second section we solve the model and we state the 
threshold epidemiological theorem for corruption. Section three, 
approximates the theoretical evolution of the honest population which is 
necessary to approximate the dynamics of the corrupt population. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
Dynamics of corrupt population  
Corruption is a substructure of human social interaction. Common 
sense associates corruption mainly with a deviation from fair play interaction 
in the development of social relations which depends on the cultural context 
of a given society. This vague description of corruption is in the spirit of 
sociology and psychology and differs from the more narrow corruption 
concepts usually considered in economics or political sciences. There, 
corruption is mainly seen as a misuse of public power to gain profit in a 
more or less illegal way. In any case, corruption has many different faces in 
its concrete appearance and no single model approach will be able to 
describe the whole picture in an adequate way. But this does not at all imply 
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that mathematical models are useless in this situation. They can provide a 
substantial improvement in our understanding of corruption as long as one 
clearly defines the aim and limitations of the taken approach. For the model 
approach developed in this article we will use the notion of corruption in the 
more general, first sense. In doing so, let‘s assume that at a given time a few 
corrupt individuals appear in a given population taken to be constant and by 
contamination they can corrupt other people. In a given country, the total 
population (Pt) can be decomposed, at every moment, in three categories: 
 
Is the fraction of the population susceptible to become corrupted 
(corruptible). It is non-corrupt persons who may become corrupted if they 
are in contact with individuals initially corrupted . 
: is the fraction of the population immunized against corruption. These 
are honest individuals who do not change their attitude regardless of the 
situation ( ). These are also people who were corrupt and were caught and 
pay for their mistakes by imprisonment or if they are removed from work to 
retirement ( ) then Ht =  +  
The model is also based on the following assumptions: 
H1: we suppose that a corruptible transmits corruption immediately when 
she/he becomes corrupted. 
H2: corrupt-corruptible exchange is proportional to the statistical average of 
contacts. The coefficient of proportionality is by definition, the rate of 
corruptibility (i). 
H3: corrupt-honest relationship is proportional to the corrupt population. The 
coefficient of proportionality defines the "good repute rate or honesty rate‖ 
(equivalent to the cure rate in an infected population usually known as the 
removal rate) (g). We suppose also that recovered corrupt are immune 
against corruption. 
 So the spread of corruption is similar to an infectious disease and can 
be represented by a dynamic system isomorphic to that of Kermack and 
McKendrick (1927). 
 
With initial conditions for t=0: C0>0, SC0>0 and H0= . As in the K-MK 
model i represents the rate of infection. To investigate the corruption spread 
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under this model, we only need to consider nonnegative solutions for C, SC 
and H. The corruption stops when Ct = 0 for the first time. Before we justify 
the approximation of the general epidemic process, let us look at system (I) 
more closely. Suppose C0 > 0, SC0 > 0, and H0 =  (this guarantees that Ht 
> 0 for all t > 0). The key question is, given parameters i and g and the 
initial number of corrupt and corruptible, whether the corruption spreads and 
how it develops with time. Notice that SCt decreases with t, and  
0 0t
t t
o
( ) 0 for all t>0 if SC /dC
=C (iSC -g) 
0 for some t>0     if SC >g/i                 dt
tC SC g g i   


  
In the case when SC0≤g/i, the number of corrupt monotonically decreases 
with time, that is no epidemic can occur. By an epidemic we mean the 
situation when Ct > C0 for some t > 0. On the other hand, when SC0 ≥ g/i, 
dCt/dt > 0 at least initially, and the number of corrupt increases in the 
beginning. We observe the threshold phenomena at SC0 =g/i, or qualitatively 
different corruption spread above and below this level. 
 
Resolution 
The system (I) is block recursive, since the first two equations are 
independent of Ht. We can then solve the system incorporating only the 
equations (1) and (2) and then find an approximation to equation (3).  Given 
the system (II): 
 
we can easily see that the orbits of (II)  belong to the curve solution of the 
following equation: 
 
Let   and integrating, we obtain: 
 
This equation describes the law of evolution of the corrupt fraction of the 
population. 
Given the monotonic decrease of the susceptible, for a given C0, the phase 
portrait of the system (II) is as follows: 
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Fig 1: Phase portrait of system (II). 
 
 
 
 
             
 
As time runs out, the solutions of (II) run their trajectories in the 
opposite direction of clockwise tending toward equilibrium point noted SCe 
(equilibrium susceptible population). 
 In this movement, the comparison between the initial number of 
corruptible and the critical value σ is important in the spread of corruption. 
 is a corruptible population less than σ, then there is no risk of spreading 
corruption. The impact of corruption measured by ( )  is reduced. 
By contrast, for , the number of people likely to be corrupted is much 
greater than σ, then an epidemic corruption occurs. 
 It therefore appears that the initial size of the corruptible population 
(SC0) and the level of the threshold term (σ) determine the evolution of 
corruption. Epidemic corruption will occur ⟺ SC0> σ. 
Theorem 
If C0 is low and SC0 = σ + ε with ε> 0 and ε/σ <<1, then the impact of 
corruption is 2ε. In this case, the equilibrium corruptible population is 
derived from the initial corruptible population SC0 in a σ symmetry center. 
 In reality corrupt are unobservable because corruption, by its very 
nature, is illicit and secretive. We can observe only corrupt individuals who 
are caught and imprisoned or removed from their work and eventually 
become honest. So to determine the dynamics of the epidemic corruption, we 
need a theoretical approximation of the evolution of the honest population 
(dHt/dt). 
 
Approximation of honest population 
Remember that we assumed that the corrupt-honest relationship is 
proportional to the corrupt population. 
 
So 
 
Then 
 
   Ct   
SCt 
         C0 
SC0
2    SC0
1 
 
SCe
1   SCe
2   SCe
3 
 
 
 
SC0
3  σ 
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We obtain 
 
If we are in conditions close to those of the preceding theorem, then  is 
small and  can be approximated by: 
 
 
The dynamics of the honest population can be written: 
(E) :    
Omitting the function  , (E) is a differential equation with separable 
variables. To integrate, we must break it down into simple elements. The 
general solution of (E) can be written: 
 
th is the hyperbolic tangent function 
 
 
Deriving  we obtain a theoretical approximation of the dynamic of the 
honest fraction. 
 
ch is the hyperbolic cosinus function. 
The symmetrical graph around    defines "the epidemic curve of 
corruption." 
Fig 2: Epidemic curve of corruption 
 
 
 
 
                       
t 
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This analysis shows that the number of resistant to corruption 
(original honest population and the removed population from corrupt to 
honest) increases monotonically. The speed at which expands the number of 
those who withdraw from the process of corruption increases and then 
decreases. The turnaround time corresponds to the inflection point of the 
evolution of the honest population. While the number of corrupt increases 
and then decreases. The reversal occurs when the number of corruptible falls 
at the epidemic threshold. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied corruption as an epidemic process. The 
framework of the SIR model of Kermack and McKendrick has allowed the 
study of corruption dynamics and the statement of a threshold 
epidemiological theorem for corruption. An epidemic corruption occurs 
when the number of corruptible surpasses the threshold term. Approximation 
of unobservable corrupt population is based on the approximation of the 
honest fraction. Empirical application of the developed theoretical model 
needs to have an idea on the number of corrupt individuals in a given country 
at a given time. This kind of data is unavailable because most estimates of 
corruption are based on surveys of perception (Transparency International, 
World Bank). In recent years a new type of corruption measure has been 
developed, the survey-based measure of bribes in which individuals are 
asked whether any government official in their countries has asked them or 
expected them to pay a bribe for his services during the previous year. As 
this type of data becomes more available we will be able to estimate such 
model. 
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